

## **Workshop Systematizität und Zweckmäßigkeit in Kants kritischer Philosophie**

Zeit: 30.03.2020 - 31.03.2020

Ort: Freie Universität Berlin, Philosophisches Institut, Thielallee 43, 14059 Berlin, Seminarraum

### **Programm:**

**Montag, den 30.03.2019**

10:00 Uhr Angela Breitenbach: Kant on Science and Systematicity

12:00 Uhr Mittagspause

13.30 Uhr Lea Ypi: The Systematic Role of Ideas in the Canon of Pure Reason

15.30 Uhr kleine Pause

16:00 Uhr Karen Koch: Das Zweckmäßigkeitsprinzips und die Voraussetzung der Erkennbarkeit der Natur

18:00 Uhr Ausklang

**Dienstag, den 31.03.2019**

10:00 Uhr Michela Massimi: Metaphysics and Perspectival Knowledge. A Kantian Tale

12:00 Uhr kleine Pause

12.30 Uhr Diskussionsrunde zum Verhältnis vom Anhang der transzendentalen Dialektik (KdrV) und der ersten und zweiten Einleitung der KdU

14:00 Uhr Ende

**Während der Diskussionsrunde sollen Antwortversuche auf die folgende Frage diskutiert werden.**

### **Frage:**

On two prominent occasions, in KrV's Appendix to the Dialectic and in KU's Introductions (published and unpublished), Kant describes some comprehensive hierarchy or system of concepts. On each occasion, he states a principle that takes the relevant hierarchical system as an aim of cognition. These principles are similar in several important respects, e. g. they are transcendental principles, they govern scientific, empirical inquiry; they are not constitutive, but regulative; they are not objective, but subjective; etc.

However, there are also marked differences between the two occasions: Primarily, that on one occasion the principle is a principle of the faculty of reason, and on the other of the faculty of judgment.

We would like to ask about the relationship between these two occasions: Are they compatible paraphrases of one and the same principle, two competing versions that indicate an unintended tension or a deliberate development in Kant's thinking, or do they describe two different principles with different complementary roles? Furthermore, we would like to ask how the relationship between the two occasions bears upon the relationship between the faculties of reason and judgment: If there is only one principle, which faculty does it define, and which faculty is left without a principle? And if there are two complementary principles, how can we explain the apparent overlap in the roles they assign to the two faculties?