

# 尼采与话语主体的伦理性识别及其生成

## Nietzsche and the Ethical Identification and Generation of Discourse Subject

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**摘要:** 针对尼采超人哲学的伦理缺失和主体性困扰问题, 本文从态度伦理入手, 抓住当代话语主体的伦理识别和生成问题, 探讨在后现代语境中重建伦理主体的必要性与可能性。论文在改造传统主体哲学和拒绝“主体取消论”的同时, 提出了伦理性主体的六点概念识别系统, 并侧重讨论了作为生成性开端的主体间交互“介入”行动的多重伦理意涵, 从而敞开了叙事艺术以及批评活动重新“为时间塑形”的语言建构价值。

**Abstract:** With ethical deficiency and subjective perplex in Nietzsche's philosophy of Superman in view, this paper probes into the necessity and possibility of re-establishing the subject of ethics in postmodern context, approaching the ethical identification and generation of contemporary discourse subject from the perspective of attitude ethics. It transfigures the traditional philosophy of subject and refutes the idea of 'abrogating the subject', and at the same time proposes a conceptual identification systems of the subject of ethics with six aspects, and discusses emphatically the multiple ethical connotations of engagement action as the starting point of generation, thus lays open the values of linguistic construction whose function is 're-configuration of time' in narrative art and criticism.

**关键词:** 尼采 态度伦理 主体识别 生成

**Key words:** Nietzsche, attitude ethics, identification of subject, generation

今天，一种批评要想获得真实的表达可能及其正当效果，不仅需要诚实和耐心，需要勇气和敏锐的思想触角，而且更需要在言说态度上做出自己的道德承诺。对于文学艺术以及各类思想、学术话语来讲，如何恢复质朴、明朗的情感能力，如何抗拒话语的权力诱惑，如何在批判激情中融入民主、宽容精神，如何建立多重视野，并在不模糊立场、轮廓和焦点的前提下形成精神生活的复调性，以及如何使批评主体非中心化地、恰如其分地到场，以便在诸多知识交流关系中培养一种有机的群体感，已构成了一系列可称之为伦理批评的“入门”问题，即态度伦理问题。

Nowadays, if a kind of criticism wants to find a possibility and a justified effect of true expression, it requires not only honesty and patience, courage and keen antenna of thought, but also moral commitment to their own attitude in speech. As far as literature, art, and all kinds of thoughts and academic discourses are concerned, how to recover a pristine and bright affective ability, how to resist the temptation of power in discourse, how to integrate democratic and tolerant spirit into criticism passion, how to establish a multi-perspective, to form a polyphony of spiritual life under the premise which unblurs the position, outline and focus, and how to make the subject of criticism uncentralize and be present appropriately in order to cultivate a organic sense of a community in various relationships of knowledge exchange, all these have constituted a series of basic problems of ethical criticism, namely, the problems of attitude ethics.

## 1. 态度伦理与批评语式

### Attitude Ethics and Critical Mode

态度伦理是批评者伦理地存在的象征。浪漫主义美学一向认为“象征”有以下特点：直觉的，直接示义的，可直观感知的，能产的，在它内部一切行动好像已经完成的，以个别显示一般的，以可见来表达不可见的等等。<sup>1</sup>我们发现，这些象征性特点几乎完全可移用于对“态度”之特性的描述，这表明，态度本身即具有语言性质，态度已经是言说、是评价，是直接的、直观的表意、表情，也是不可见的价值伦理的可见形式。作为来自身体语言的“象征”行为，“态度”同样依靠了语言的“自然”本质和文化道德力量，即批评语言自身所蓄积着的表态功能和创化功能，从而生产性地支配着现实的交往行为，并将我们引向一个超现实的具有价值指示作用的世界。

Attitude ethics is the symbol of the ethical existence of critics. The aesthetics of Romanticism always regards 'symbol' as intuitive, implicit, immediately perceptible, productive, with all action having seemingly been completed in its interior, indicating the general by the particular, and expressing the invisible by the visible, etc. And we

find that all the characteristics above can be used to describe 'attitude' as well, i.e., attitude contains similar linguistic characters as symbol. Attitude is itself already a speech and evaluation, an intuitive and direct signification and expression, and a visible form of the invisible value ethics. As an action of symbolization out of the language of our body, attitude relies as well on the nature and moral power of language—the function of assertion and creation, and accordingly maneuvers the actual communication in the sense of production and brings us into a surreal value-indicating world.

态度是唯一可以由我们自己作主的事情。它具有瞬间的确定性，它标示了批评主体的伦理位向。这个位向，既不是宿命地被给定的，也不是随心所欲的自我选择，作为领会了文学或社会交流情境后所做的伦理决断，态度和位向乃是交互主体间(例如文本、世界、作者、读者之间)关系的产物，它起始于不同意向的伦理交织作用。态度伦理不仅使批评者获得了当下的位置感(主体到位)，而且也超越性地开放了批评活动的价值向度，它表明批评致力于理解并创造自己的交往对象及其衍生物，并意欲由此而达到“文明的互惠”。诚如伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯所说：“不对称的主体间性是超越的所在地。在主体维护其主体性的时候，主体有着并非一定要返回自身的可能性，有着多产的可能性和生一个儿子的可能性”。<sup>2</sup>这也是说，交互关系是否属于积极的、良性的、增值的，将取决于批评主体对自我与批评对象之真实关系的认知，以及话语主体的自我再生产要求。

Attitude is the only thing we can determine on our own. It has instantaneous certainty and marks out the ethical position and orientation of critical subject. This position and orientation is an ethical resolution due to an understanding of the context of literary or societal communication. It is neither given by fate nor chosen by ourselves at will. Attitude, together with position and orientation, is the product of inter-subjective relationships (such as those between texts, worlds, authors, and readers) and it arises from the ethical interweaving of varied intentions. Attitude ethics not only helps critics recognize their present position (subjective position), but also transcendently opens up a value dimension for critical activity. It shows that criticism always tries to understand and create its own communicative targets and its derivatives, and thereby achieves 'beneficial reciprocity of inter-civilizations'. As Emmanuel Levinas put it, transcendence dwells in asymmetric inter-subjectivity; when subject tries to maintain its subjectivity, it has the possibility of not having to return to itself, of being prolific, and of bearing a son. That is to say, whether an inter-relationship is positive, benign and reproductive, is dependent on the critical subject's recognition of the real relation between its self and its critical targets, and on the demand for self-reproduction by discourse subject.

就批评语式而言，态度伦理动态地体现了现象学意义上的批评意识的“被给予性”、“权能性”和“构造性”。某些由形容词-名词或由形容词（副词）-动词构成的短语，——例如，“去面具性”、“诚实的表达”、“耐心的倾听”、“开放的心态”、“善于发现”、“勇于质疑、挑战”、“有理由的反驳、批判”、“经过充分准备的回应”、“直接的或委婉的提示”、“具体地、有条理地陈述”、“切身性的体认”、“注重双向反思”、“低调的语言质态”、“避免以势压人”、“保持交流性往返”、“恰当的沉默”、“毅然的中断”、“用‘可能’取代‘应当’”、“必要的妥协”、“让渡性地礼让(咽下最后一句话)”等等，——都不应被解释为某种话语策略，而应被理解为态度伦理方面的自由和尊重，既是批评活动的自由，也是意义之生产过程的自由；既是对真理之无限性的尊重，也是对我们“在真理”面前之渺小性的尊重。

在此，“态度的承诺”被卷入对时间的“托付”，标上了某种精神刻度而使批评活动形成其特有的伦理形体。这不可替代的努力，诞生了一个又一个批评伦理的“瞬间”，在这些瞬间里，批评与其对象的交流关系不仅是道德的，同时也是美学的、政治的。

As for critical mode, attitude ethics reflects dynamically the 'given-ness', 'Vermöglichkeit' (empowerment) and 'constructivity' of critical consciousness in phenomenological sense. Such phrases made up of adjective-noun or adverb-verb like 'de-mask', 'faithful expression', 'patient listening', 'open-minded', 'skilfully discovering', 'brave to question and challenge', 'justifiable retorting and criticising', 'well-prepared response', 'direct or indirect hints', 'concrete and orderly statement', 'vicarious comprehension', 'bidirectional reflecting', 'low-profile language attitude', 'shy of powerful aggression', 'adherent to communicative reciprocity', 'appropriate silence', 'determined suspension', 'substituting "should" for "may"', 'necessary compromise', and 'transferring politeness' etc., should not be interpreted as discourse strategies, but should be understood as the freedom of and respect for attitude ethics. Freedom means the freedom of critical activity and the production of meaning, while respect means the respect for the infinity of truth and our tininess in front of 'truth'.

Hereon, 'promise of attitude' is involved in 'entrusting' to time, and label a sort of spiritual scale thus make critical activity to form its own body of ethics. This irreplaceable endeavour gives birth to 'moments' of critical ethics one after another. In these moments, the communicative relationship between criticism and its target is not only moral but also aesthetic and political.

## 2. 话语主体的伦理性识别

### **Ethical Identification of the Discourse Subject**

那么，究竟何谓伦理批评的主体，它和一般的话语主体有着什么样的区别？在回应这一问题时，我们需要注意的是方法论要求方面的特殊性，由于批评（叙事）伦理不同于社会规范伦理，所以从规范角度对批评主体的伦理质性给出综合的概念性定义既是困难的，也是容易貌似客观而流于空疏的。这里，我们将尝试着从若干个方面对“批评伦理主体”的性质、特征作出理论性描述，以达到反思性感知的可靠性。

Then, what on earth is subject of ethical criticism? In what way does it differ from a normal discourse subject? To answer these questions, we should pay attention to the particularity of methodological requirement. The ethics of criticism (narration) is different from the ethics of social norms, thus it is difficult to give an over-all conceptual definition on the ethical nature of a critical subject from the perspective of social norms. The definition might seem objective while is actually empty. Here, we are trying to furnish a theoretical description of the nature and features of the 'subject of critical ethics', so as to achieve a reflective perceptual reliability.

从形式伦理的角度说，任何言说者只要通过材料的取舍、安排而构建了某种话语序列，给出了相对完整和连续的信息传递，他就已经是一个广义的伦理主体了，不管他构建的序列和给出的信息在接受者眼里，究竟是趋向于“善”的、“对”的还是趋向于“恶”的、“错”的。在这个意义上，我们可以说，相对于各种言说活动，“伦理”乃是一种先验性存在，任何话语行为的发生学前提必须是“伦理”的而不可能是“去伦理”的。

In formal ethics, anyone who has established a discourse order and finished a relatively complete and continuous message deliverance through the selection and rearrangement of materials can be considered broadly as an ethical subject, despite that the order and message may be either on the good, right side or on the bad, wrong side in the eyes of the recipients. In this sense, we can say 'ethics', comparing with other speech activities, is transcendental, i.e. the genetic condition of any discourse activity must be 'ethical' rather than 'non-ethical'.

比如，我们无法想象一种“去伦理”的“叙事”，就如同无法想象搭积木、盖房子居然可以不遵循一定的先后次序。按照这一形式化原理，“批评伦理”显然不可以简单地被识别为言说者对言说对象（如人物、事件）的道德评价，或言说者所持的某些或隐或显的观念或价值倾向。

'Non-ethical narration' is as unimaginable as piling up building blocks or building a house without following certain order. According to this formalizing principle, it is evident that 'critical ethics' can never be simply identified as the speaker's moral

judgment on what is said, or any kind of notion or value orientation by the speaker, implicit or explicit.

然而，我们又不得不承认，这种广义的、形式化的伦理主体不免是过于泛化的、受符号学控制的、单性的和缺乏蓬勃生殖力的，它缺少“活人”的整体气息。例如，叙事学关注的形式要素之间的关系，虽然“自律”地构成了特定的形式伦理涵义，也能够从无意识层面披露叙述者的部分“用意”，但由于形式要素不仅不能完全说明话语主体的伦理质性，而且还可能因修辞性的面具效果混淆人们对话语主体的真实感知，如果要在叙述伦理的层面上对话语主体给予较充分而全面的伦理性识别，我们就不能忽略伦理性内涵的分层理解和复合性质，更不能不顾及话语主体的形式化过程与其内在性过程实际上存在着的粘连关系、互塑关系甚至悖反关系。

Nevertheless, we have to admit that, this broadly-defined and formalist ethical subject appears inevitably too generalized, too saturated with semiotics, too unisexual and sterile, lacking in the wholeness of a 'live person'. For example, narratology focuses on the relation between formal elements, which 'automatically' constitutes certain connotation of formal ethics and reveals partly the 'intention' of the narrator in terms of unconsciousness, yet we must not ignore the stratified understanding and the compound-ness of the ethical connotation, not to mention the adjoining, inter-figrating, and even contradicting relation actually existing in the process of formalization and internalization of the discourse subject. This is because formal elements cannot fully demonstrate the ethical nature of discourse subject, but may on the contrary confound his actual perception due to the mask effect of their rhetoric.

尽管批评话语所出示的伦理面目，常常是多样的、变化的，就像一个人的主体身份往往有自我设定的诸多可能，在比较宽泛的意义上，我们每个人其实都拥有多种“主体”身份，从性别主体、欲望主体、情感主体、阶级主体、族群主体到观察主体、参与主体、竞争主体、法权主体、消费主体、娱乐主体等等，“我”的主体性事实上一直是偶然的、随机的、混杂的、暧昧的、待定的、漂移的，因此，对“我”的伦理考量从来不会也无法凝固于某一个确定的身份“点”上。

Though critical discourse may often take on diverse and varied ethical appearances just like a subject identity which has normally several possibilities of self-definition, and in a broad sense, every one of us has factually more than one 'subject' identities, namely subject of gender, desire, emotion, class, nation, observation, participation, competition, legal rights, consumption, and entertainment etc., the subjectivity of 'I' is virtually fortuitous, random, mixed, ambiguous, drifting, and awaiting definition. Therefore, the ethical contemplation on 'I' cannot and will not plunge into a certain identity 'point'.

然而，正是由于这一不确定性，通过言述，通过找到自我之所以成为“这一个”自我的语言，伦理性的话语主体才能够被建立起来，才能证明这个“我”不是一个随便什么其他人的“复制品”。在此，话语主体的伦理特性要得到有效识别，就离不开批评者的自由“选择”和价值“定向”。而“选择”和“定向”，则又意味着一种限制，一种主体运用其自由意志加诸于自身的限制，——这是自由伦理主体所遇到的真正的悖论。但这一悖论却是我们识别话语主体的积极的指标，企图人为地摆脱这个悖论的困扰，反而会使自我陷于分裂、简约或虚假之中，因为伦理性话语主体就是以某种“选择”和“定向”为前提，通过批评（叙事）过程对观察、阅读的繁复经验及其内在矛盾的整饬而形成的。

However, it is on this uncertainty that the ethical discourse subject can be established through narration and by finding a language which makes 'this' I my self, and can certify that this 'I' is no replica of any other one person. Here, a valid identification of the ethical particularities of discourse subject cannot happen without free 'choice' and 'orientation' of value, while 'choice' and 'orientation' means confinement, a self-confinement imposed on the subject by himself. This is the real paradox a free ethical subject may encounter. Yet this paradox is a positive guide for identifying discourse subject. Any attempt to get rid of the perplex of this paradox may lead to a split, simplified and false self, for the ethical discourse subject presupposes certain 'choice' and 'orientation', and is formed by accumulating and tidying the complicated experience and inner conflicts of observation and reading in the process of criticism (narration).

一般而言，主体性的确立与自我认同相关。但任何自我认同都需要参照，如果这一参照滞留于个体或类型自身，则会陷入那喀索斯式的自恋。在欧洲的自我认同传统里，按汉斯·罗伯特·姚斯的研究，这一参照原先一直属于上帝，至18世纪的启蒙时代，是卢梭把本应面向上帝的忏悔、祈祷引入公共领域，使之贬值为公开的对话，由此，个体期待获得的认可从纵轴（上帝）移向了横轴（社会、公众）。

By and large, the establishment of subjectivity is closely related to self-identity. However, self-identity needs reference. If it lingers on an individual or type, it will fall into narcissism. According to Hans Robert Jauss, in the tradition of European self-identity, this reference belongs always to God. It was not until the time of Enlightenment in the seventeenth Century that Rousseau introduced confession and praying, which were formerly done toward God, into public sphere, and thus reduced them to public conversation. The self-identity an individual might expect has thereafter shifted from vertical axis (God) to horizontal axis (society, the public).

姚斯这一带有贬义的说法确认了一个事实，正是卢梭首开了把自我认同的参照从上帝引向社会和他人的先河。卢梭之后，从个体、个性到主体再度经历了康德式的启蒙转换，“参照”被追溯到认知的先验领域，如同哈贝马斯所作的分析，“自康德以来，

先验同时被看作是创造世界的主体和具有自主行为能力的主体”，接着，费希特“用独立性概念把认知主体与实践主体的先验能力统一了起来，把世界构成与自我决定统一了起来，并把它们推向极端，使之成为自我设定的原始行为”。<sup>3</sup>但我们知道，费希特式的原始“唯我论”根本经不起各种现代系统性思考的掂量，尤其当“实践主体”这一概念释放了它的历史能量后，自我认同的参照系再也无法依赖某些单一的、恒定的对象了，由此，“我”只能在自身的历史实践中不断地接受多维参照，这使主体的自我认同方式日渐变得复杂和困难起来。

These derogatory remarks by Jausss confirm the fact that it was Rousseau who initially shifted the reference of self-identity from God to society and the other. After Rousseau, there was again a Kantian enlightenment which transformed individual, personality and subject, meanwhile the ‘reference’ was traced back to transcendental domain. Habermas once said, since Kant, the transcendental was considered to be a subject which created its world and had its autonomy; and subsequently, Fichte united the transcendental ability of cognitive subject and practical subject with the concept ‘independence’, united the construction of the world and self-resolution, thus carried them to the extreme to make this concept to be the primitive action of self-identity. But we all know that the primitive Fichtian ‘solipsism’ cannot endure the investigation of various modern philosophical systems. Particularly after the concept ‘practical subject’ has freed its historical energy, the reference system of self-identity can no longer rely on any singular and constant object. Therefore, the ‘I’ can only take multi-dimensional references continuously in historical practice, and in turn it makes self-identity more and more complex and difficult.

正是在此背景下，西方启蒙文化遭遇了两种完全相反的关于“主体”命运的解释：一种可谓之“主体性”的，因对自我的人性力量仍抱有信任和期待，便企望以主体为中心去缔构世界或给出意义；另一种则可谓之“去主体化”的，即认为主体完全受无意识操控，乃一空洞能指，随即明确地宣布“主体已死”。这是在两极观念之间所产生的对撞，我们还没有理由必须接受其中的任何一种看法。

It is based on this that Western enlightenment culture meets two totally opposite interpretations of the fate of ‘subject’. One of which is called “subjective”, for it still has trust and expectation on the strength of humanity of self and thus hopes to create or construct the world or give the world its meaning, taking subject as the center. The other is called “non-subjective”, which holds that subject is completely manipulated by unconsciousness and is an empty signifier, and consecutively proclaims the ‘death of subject’. The collision between these two poles has no reason to makes us accept either one.



在我看来，如同理论上的相互报复，出现这种极端的“对撞”现象，正是由于“主体性”问题尚未被提上“伦理日程”而造成的结果，只有将“主体性”提到伦理学的议事日程上来，这种“对撞”才能被有效规避。对启蒙文化史的这一理性反思有助于我们认识到，从伦理性角度重新料理主体的性质、位向，某种通过叙述行动而获得的主体的自我认同并非是一件不可以想象的事情。

In my opinion, this kind of extreme collision, like retaliation between theories, is the very consequence of having not yet put the 'subjective' issue on the 'ethical agenda'. Only when subjectivity comes into the view of ethics, can the collision be avoided. This rational reflection on the history of enlightenment culture helps us realize that self-identity of subject gained through narration is not unimaginable if we cast a new light on the nature, position and orientation of the subject.

以此，所谓话语伦理以及批评伦理的主体如何安身的问题，将在以下一些非尺度的尺度性伦理时空中得到揭示：（1）主体移心。这就是说，主体必须从世界之“圆”的圆心移开，退出它曾自以为可占据的中心位置，不再以自我意志为核心去结构世界、支配事物；（2）主体见证性。主体自身不能单独地构成意义之源，它只是经历和见证着世界，它自身实践活动的意义也需要得到历史的验证，所以，各种话语主体总是处在相互见证的时间过程之中；（3）主体界面化。由于共同作为主体而存在，所以任何主体都无权把其他主体当成对象化的客体来对待，这样，主体间关系本质上只能构成彼此的界面性连结，存在于一种差异性的共处状态里；（4）主体侧身。主体的移心、见证性、界面化，都意味着主体也是一种“放行”的通道，它不应也不可能固定地堵在某个地方，阻挡其他事物、意义的涌入；（5）主体虚位。鉴于主体自身可意识到的限度性和单薄性，主体始终期待着被拓展、被充实，不时的虚位以待显示了必要的开放性，这恰恰是主体自觉意识到其存在而非不存在的明证；（6）主体未完成性。主体通过叙说、评价来建构自身的过程是一个漫长的历程，知识经验的变化，异质性因素的导入，实践过程的循环。

Therefore, the problem as to where to locate discourse ethics and subject of critical ethics will be uncovered in an ethical space-time, which serves as confinement yet is no confinement at all. 1) Subject as a non-center, i.e. subject must be moved from the central point of world circle which it assumes to be able to dominate, and tries no more to construct the world and manipulate things out of the will of the self. 2) Subject as a witness. Subject cannot constitute meaning on its own. It only experiences and witnesses the world, while the meaning of his own practice needs historical confirmation. Hence different discourse subjects always serve as witness for each other in temporal process. 3) Subject as an interface. No single subject has the right to treat other subjects as an object for every one of them is subject, thus, the inter-subjective relationship is in essence only an interface-like connection. They stick together in a differential co-existing state. 4) Subject leans to other side. Being a non-center, witness,

and interface, subject also means leaning to other side to make a passage to 'let other pass'. It should not and cannot stay in the way and prevent the influx of things and meaning. 5) Subject as a vacancy. Due to the limits and frailty subject itself may be aware of, subject always expects to be extended and fulfilled. Constant vacancy by subject shows an indispensable openness, which attests to the self-consciousness of its existence rather than non-existence. 6) Subjective in incompleteness. It is a long way for subject to construct itself through narration and assessment, for the construction involves the evolution of knowledge and experience, the introduction of heterogenic elements, and the circulation of practice.

以上六点，旨在对传统主体哲学作出决定性改造，同时也拒绝了后现代主义的“主体取消论”，它们从主体的质性、位向等方面，向我们提供了批评主体之伦理特征的概念识别系统。这一识别系统的有效性不仅可经受社会交往理论的检验，同样也能得到来自语言符号学的支持，例如朱莉娅·克里斯蒂瓦就认为：“如果事实上从意指系列存在开始就一直存在着一个无可回避的言说‘主体’的话，那么，这一主体显然为了与其异质性保持一致，必定会成为一个未定的‘处于生成中的主体’”。<sup>4</sup>但我们必须意识到，这六点概念识别系统所提示的伦理性主体原则，只是从理性的、可经验的角度坚持了批评主体的伦理面向，尚不足以保障主体能够成功地抵御来自现实世界的非伦理侵袭。

These six aspects mentioned above are aimed at a determined transfiguration on conventional subject philosophy and a refutation of the 'abolishment of subject'. They provide us a conceptual identification system with ethical features of a critical subject in terms of the nature, the position and orientation of subject. The validity of this system can not only stand the test from theory of communication, but can also find support from semiotics. Just as Julia Kristeva said, if there has been as a matter of fact an unavoidable 'subject' of speech since the birth of signification series, this subject would necessarily be an uncertain 'subject in process of generation' so as to accord with its heterogeneity. But we should bear in mind that the principles of ethical subject elicited from these six points agree with the ethics of critical subject only from a rational and practical point of view, and cannot yet safeguard subject against the non-ethical assailment from actual world.

在当代政治、经济、文化的具体境遇中，对话语主体的主要伦理威胁将来自各种制度性的和非制度性的力量，例如：（1）对专制的权威符号或者霸权意识形态的反抗，一方面可能导致话语主体被人为地“消声”，另一方面也可能使反抗者在其反抗过程中，被自己竭力反对的东西所同化；（2）话语主体的孤独感和无力感，往往不是来自生命存在的脆弱性，而是缘于他的表达得不到来自他人的伦理性回应，有作家曾就此发出感慨，个体完全裸露在历史的视野里，显得非常渺小、微弱，有一点思想、声音，马

上就会被“沙漠”吸收、蒸发；（3）当主体价值被定位在“奋求者”的目标内容，“竞争制度就成为这一社会的灵魂”，从而形成一体两面的非伦理、反伦理状况，一是话语主体被“工业主义的主遵伦理的价值观……有用价值和工具价值”所绑架，另一是使流俗的或无力的人产生怨恨、压抑；<sup>5</sup>（4）当话语主体的行动热情与想象中的象征性秩序发生分离时，一种“拉康式主体”的精神分裂症将撕裂自我，甚至可能在瞬间形成齐泽克所谓的神秘的“无头主体”（*acephalous*）现象，即“我甚至不知道自己做了什么，事情就这么发生了”；<sup>6</sup>（5）在一个以市场逻辑和消费文化为主导的历史时期，劳动、生产、工作逐渐成为匿名存在并丧失着自己的基础性价值，主体的话语处境开始与现代化及其扩张形式全球化的分工、游戏规则密不可分，由而，技术化、功利化、知识领域的人为分割、情感的伪造和被控制，以及强势话语的覆盖和夷平趋势，将对话语主体构成尖锐的伦理挑战；等等。

In the concrete context of contemporary politics, economy and culture, the main threats for discourse subject come from various institutional and non-institutional powers such as 1) the rebellion against the symbol of despotic authority or hegemonic ideology, which may on the one hand leads to suppression of the subject's voice, and on the other hand makes the rebels assimilated by what they rebel against; 2) the solitude and powerlessness of subject, which usually results not from the fragility of existence, but from the fact that his expression receives no ethical response from others. Some writer has moaned that individuals, being exposed in the historical horizon, appear tiny and weak, and every bit of thinking and voice would promptly be absorbed or evaporated by the 'desert'. 3) When the subject is valued as the goal of 'strugglers and competitors', competitive system will become the soul of the society, and then a two-faced non-ethics or anti-ethics will appear, i.e. discourse subject being kidnapped by the dominant ethics of industrialism that are practical value and instrumental value, and lower or powerless people being made to feel repressed and resentful. 4) When the enthusiasm for action of discourse subject derails from the imaginary symbolic order, a schizophrenia of Lacanian subject will tear the 'self' apart, or a Zizek's so called mystic 'acephalous' phenomenon, meaning 'I don't even know what I have done, it just so happened', will come into being instantaneously. 5) In a historical period dominated by market logic and consumer culture, labor, production, and work gradually become anonymous and lose their own basic values. The discourse context of subject begins to intertwine with modernization as well as the labor division and game rules of its globalized expansion. Therefore, technicalization, utilitarianism, the artificial division of knowledge, the counterfeiting and manipulation of affection, and the overshadowing

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and leveling by discourses more powerful, will become bitter ethical challenges to the discourse subject.

### 3. 介入：伦理批评主体的生成

#### **Engagement: the Generation of Subject of Ethical Criticism**

现在可以这么说，我们已深入到当代批评主体所面临的实质性困境中去了。这一困境如此客观，如此真实，那个制造了这一困境的匿名的“‘大他者’（被启蒙公众舆论人格化）”<sup>7</sup>，看起来不可思议地强大，它正在击碎所有对道德和美学的顽固依恋，让一切经验领域的价值形态发生畸变，它还随心所欲地榨取主体的精髓，迫使所有主体“表象化”、“空洞化”，.....面对这一起源于“现代性”的美学—伦理—政治僵局，任何尼采式的“超人”期待或“个人自治”、“自我隐身”都无法解脱我们，除了在伦理决断及政治承担中成就自己，任何患上了单一审美相思症的批评家实际上已无处可遁。

It can be said that we have deeply plunged into the substantial dilemma that the subject of contemporary criticism is facing. The dilemma is so objective and real, the anonymous ‘the Other’ (being personified by the public opinion of enlightenment) which made the dilemma looks so incredibly powerful, that it has shattered all obstinate attachment to moral and aesthetics, deformed the values in all experience fields. Meanwhile it exploits at will the essence of subject, forcing subject into being ‘superficial’, ‘empty’, etc. Confronting with this aesthetic-ethical-political deadlock which stems from ‘modernity’, there is no hope for us to be liberated by any expectation from Nietzschean ‘Superman’ or ‘individual autonomy’ or ‘self hiding’. Except fulfilling oneself in ethical resolution and political undertakings, any critic suffering from one-fold aesthetic lovesickness has actually nowhere to escape.

我们知道，世界是以时间的方式存在的。通常，人们沿用一种古典的时间观念，把时间分为三维，即过去、现在和将来，与此相应，时间也获得了它的心理形式：“过去”对应的是回忆；“现在”对应的是感知；“将来”对应的则是想象。假如在这样一个形而上学的时间框架里去寻找介入行动的可能性，那么我们根本就无法确认“介入”究竟位于时间的哪一个维度。通常，由于“现在”正处于被质疑或被否决的状态，我们很可能会根据这样一个时间框架，把“介入”的理由系于“过去”和“将来”其中的一维，或者一味地怀念被经典化的过去，或者主观地想象着虚妄的将来。

As we all know, the world exists in a temporal way. People usually observe a classical concept of time which divides time into three dimensions, namely the past, the present and the future, and accordingly, time also gained its psychological form, i.e. the

past corresponds to memory, the present to perception, and the future to imagination. If we look for the possibilities to engage in such a system of metaphysical time, we could not confirm which time dimension exactly the engagement lies in. More often not we would link the reason for engagement to one of the two dimensions: the past and the future, either stubbornly missing the canonized past or imagining subjectively the vain and intangible future, because 'the present' is being questioned or negated.

这样的“介入”当然是缺乏现实感和有效性的，自我并非不能意识到这一点，所以，批评者总是会感到犹豫，感到自己什么也没有准备好。当然，“没有准备好”并不一定是托辞，就历史条件或机缘来讲，它也可能是事实，由于历史变化的未知性，我们往往难以确认何谓“准备好了”的那个时间节点，所以只能“时刻准备着”。仅此而言，我们可以认为，只有在放弃了“时刻准备着”的情况下，“没有准备好”才是搪塞和托辞，这里的区分，有没有生成主体的能动性努力是真正的关键。但我们知道，所谓的能动性努力是离不开理想和激情的，而问题恰恰在于，作为一种集体无意识，“没有准备好”常常把“介入”的一切可能性都交给了理性的算计。这正是资本主义会计性格的典型特征，被工具化了的知识精英很容易青睐这种理性，不仅在经济领域，甚至在文化政治领域也力图贯彻这种数理式的依赖于专业知识、等级和分层所带来的效率。

Such engagement lacks naturally a sense of reality and validity, which the self may be conscious of. This is why critics are always hesitant, feeling not ready yet. Of course, 'not ready yet' is not necessarily an excuse, it may also be the fact in terms of historical conditions or opportunities. Due to the uncertainty of historical changes, it is difficult for us to identify the time spot where we are so-called 'ready'. Therefore the only thing we can do is to 'be ready' intentionally or psychologically. This is the case, we may consider 'not ready yet' to be an excuse only when one gives up 'being ready' intentionally or psychologically. This distinction lies essentially in whether there is initiative effort of a generative subject. Meanwhile, we all know that, what is called initiative effort cannot do without ideal and passion. But the problem is that, as a kind of collective unconsciousness, 'not ready yet' often hands the possibilities of engagement over to rational calculation. This is the typical characteristic of capitalist accounting. Instrumentalized intellectual elites are quite inclined to favor this rationality. Thus people are trying very hard to put into effect the mathematical efficiency which relies on expertise, grading and stratification not only in the field of economy but also in the field of culture and politics.

过去，我们一直误以为，只有社会主义才搞计划经济，而资本主义因为依赖自由市场则必然是反计划的，但也许我们忽略了，其实在更高的层面上，资本主义也有自己的计划。例如，它现在已经企望通过高度的科学理性和技术主义宰制，通过全球化的路径，对整个世界作出它所意欲的帝国式规划、安排和分工，那个“大他者”，那个将“权力运用于自身再生产”（福柯语）的全球性规训机制，正在实行的其实是某种“计划

政治”。顺从还是抵制这个“大他者”，拥抱还是质疑诸如此类的“政治计划”，不仅取决于各民族国家基于自身长远利益的权衡，对我们每一个关心世界命运，并想讲述和评论这个�界的故事的人来说，也不能不加以仔细掂量。

In the past, we incorrectly believed that, only socialism practices planned economy, while capitalism is necessarily anti-planned because it relies on free market. Yet we might have overlooked that, capitalism has factually its own plans at a higher level. For example, it is now expecting to implement its well-intended imperial planning, arrangement and labor-division of the whole world through a highly scientific rationality and technological domination and in the way of globalization. The Other, the global discipline mechanism which ‘applies its power to self-reproduction’ (Foucault), is actually carrying out a ‘politics of planning’. Whether to submit to or to resist ‘the Other’, to embrace or to question such a ‘political project’, not only depends on the weighing of each nation based on long-term interest, but also on the contemplation we have to make out of the concern for the future of our world and for the story of the world we are going to narrate and comment on.

在这样的时刻，批评者将无可选择，他只能听从在具体的生存境遇和交往关系中产生的内心良知的召唤，从而作出属于自己的价值伦理决断。对个体而言，作出某个伦理决断具有“事件”的性质，因为这正是一个批评伦理主体的生成性开端。“决断”不仅来自审美欲望、道德情感冲动和历史责任意识的瞬间爆发，而且意味着一个无奈的“自我”终于获得了断裂这一“无奈”的语言——“介入”世界的语言。“介入”结束了犹疑、观望、彷徨，在停顿的或已被虚化的时间中突然隆起了一个醒目的空间坐标，也许，“路”会重新出现。

At such moments, critics will have no choice but to listen to the inner call of their conscience which is shaped in specific living conditions and communicative relationships, and to thereby make their own resolution of ethics and values. For the individual, making an ethical resolution has the nature of an event, because this is rightly the genetic starting point of the subject of critical ethics. Resolution derives not only from the instantaneous outbreak of aesthetic desire, moral passion and consciousness of historical responsibility, but also means a helpless self finally getting a language that breaks this helplessness---a language that engages the world. Engagement terminates hesitation, wait-and-see, and oscillation. A remarkable spatial coordinate emerges in this halted or nullified time; a path might as well reappear.

#### 4. 筹划、游牧与“为时间塑形”

##### **Project, Nomadic and ‘Configuration of Time’**

介入具有批评行动的当下性，“当下”彻底打破了线性时间的匀速流程。所谓线性时间，强调的是进化，是事物发展的连续性；如果反过来，进化改成退化也一样，退化也是线性的连续过程。“当下”彻底结束了这类关于时间连续性的幻象，中止了线性时间又开启了另一种时间。被开启的时间当然是非线性的，但并不是人们可能误以为是的那种“非线性”。为了深刻地了解“介入”作为一个行动范畴的时间伦理意义，这里有两个参照性概念值得一提：一个是海德格尔一般生存论意义上的“筹划”，另一个是德勒兹建立于根茎理论之上的“游牧”。

Engagement enjoys the present-ness of critical activity, and ‘the present’ breaks up completely the uniform flow of linear time. The so-called linear time emphasizes on evolution and continuous development. Degeneration is also a linear succession. The Present, in this way, has eliminated those illusions about continuous development and opens up simultaneously a new dimension of time. The non-linearity of this new time is different from what we used to think of ‘non-linearity’ as. For a deeper understanding of the temporal ethical meaning of engagement as a category of action, two referential concepts are worth mentioning, one of which is Martin Heidegger’s Project (Entwurf) in general ontological sense, the other is Gilles Deleuze’s Nomadic based on his rhizome theory.

我们知道，在《存在与时间》中，海德格尔还原了“此在”的生存论结构，这一结构包括三大环节：被抛、筹划、沉沦。“被抛”显示此在无来由地被抛入这个世界的被动性；“筹划”则意味着此在的主动性，因为人总是“先行于世”，总是能够把自己抛向将来，按照将来的期待来规划自己；但此在在世界中又不能完全按照自己的意向来筹划，会被卷入种种复杂关系，从而一心一意地注意当前，所谓“沉沦”，指的就是这样一种依附性的生存状态。在海德格尔看来，这一生存论结构也是一种时间性结构，被抛对应于“时间过去”，筹划对应于“时间将来”，沉沦则对应于“时间现在”。<sup>8</sup>而伦理决断所导致的“介入”行动不同于“筹划”，它要打破的就是海德格尔所谓的“沉沦”状态，“介入”虽然也对应于“时间现在”，却已把汲取“过去”和开辟“将来”同时纳入了“当下”，不仅如此，“介入”的行动性连结了他人，也需要他人，它不会把他人当作一种干扰性存在。

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger restores the existential structure of Dasein, which includes three moments: thrownness (Geworfenheit), projecting (Entwurf), and fallenness (Verfallenheit). Thrownness shows the passivity of Dasein’s coming into this world groundlessly. Projecting means the initiative of Dasein to always ‘live ahead of one’s time’, to always project oneself into future, and to plan itself in accordance with their anticipations. But Dasein cannot project itself in the world solely by its own

intention. It would instead be involved in various complicated relationships and its attention would thus totally occupied by the present. This state is named fallenness, a dependent state of existence. In the view of Heidegger, this existential structure is also a temporal structure--thrownness corresponds to the past, projecting to the future and fallenness to the present. Engagement following ethical resolution is different from Heideggerian projecting and is meant to break the fallen state. Though engagement corresponds to the present too, it also takes in the present while extracting the past and opening up the future. Besides, engagement connects and needs the other, and will not treat the other as an interfering existence.

对海德格尔沉思式的此在，汉娜·阿伦特有一系列深刻批评。她很早就意识到，“海德格尔认为，人类伙伴关系只是存在的必要结构因素，但却阻碍（每个人实现）自我存在。他的这一看法并不正确。只有在共同世界的人类共同生活中，才会有（真正的）存在。”<sup>9</sup>在《人的境况》一书里，阿伦特更具体地进行了她的阐述：“我们以言说和行动让自己切入人类世界，这种切入就像人的第二次诞生，在其中我们亲自确认和承担起了我们最初的身体显现这一赤裸裸的事实。这个切入不像劳动那样是必然性强加于我们的，也不像工作那样是被有用性所促迫的，而是被他人的在场所激发的，因为我们想要加入他们，获得他们的陪伴。但它又不完全被他人所左右，因为它的动力来自我们诞生时带给这个世界的开端，我们以自身的主动性开创了某个新的东西，来回应这个开端。去行动，在最一般的意义上，意味着去创新、去开始，发动某件事。”她紧接着又说：“言说和行动的彰显性质出现在人们和其他人在一起的地方，既不是为他人而活，也不是与他人敌，即出现在纯粹的人类归属感当中……由于行动内在地彰显行动者的倾向，它的充分显现就有赖于我们曾经称为荣耀的光芒，而这只有在公共领域中才是可能的。”<sup>10</sup>

About this Heideggerian contemplative Dasein, Hannah Arendt has a series of criticism. She realized quite early that, for Heidegger, human fellowship is nothing more than a necessary structural element of existence yet blocks (the fulfillment of) human existence, and that his view is not right, for only in living together in a common world lies the real existence. In *The Human Condition*, Arendt continues her discussion in more details: 'With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance. This insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, and it is not prompted by utility, like work. It may be stimulated by the presence of others whose company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we were born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our own initiative. To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin, to set something into motion.' And then she continues, 'this revelatory quality of speech and action



comes to the fore where people are *with* others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness.....Because of its inherent tendency to disclose the agent together with the act, action needs for its full appearance the shining brightness we once called glory, and which is possible only in the public realm.’

法国后现代哲学家德勒兹、加塔利倒不存在阿伦特所批评的问题，甚至与海德格尔完全相反，他们以四处“游牧”替代了此在只能在此的“筹划”。在游牧者眼里，游牧是最自由的，它任意地逃逸或进入，没有边界，也不受任何限制，哪里合适就去哪里。游牧政治之所以可能，在德勒兹看来，是因为世界、思维、文本、知识都呈全方位开放的根茎状态，“根茎”（“块茎”）就是各种各样的枝条，互相纠缠、盘绕，无中心、无等级、无标准、无秩序，在地表平面生成、繁殖、蔓延，它没有固定的根部位置，也没有开始和终结，可以随机流变，通向四面八方。<sup>11</sup>著名的“游牧思想”和“根茎理论”，严厉（也是部分正确地）批判了用“树形”来描写时间、历史和人类精神图像的模式。很显然，“根茎”所具有的联系性、异质性、多元性、反意指裂变、制图学、贴花等原则性特征，由于体现了欲望机器的无限生产力，对互联网时代的赛博空间、数字文化艺术有高度解释效力。

The problems Arendt has pointed out do not exist in French postmodern philosophers Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. Opposite to Heidegger, they have replaced Dasein’s ‘projecting’ from Here with ‘nomading’ everywhere. In the eyes of nomads, nomading is most free. There is no boundary, no limitation; one can enter any suitable place and flee from any unsuitable one. For Deleuze, nomadic politics is possible because the world, thinking, text, and knowledge are all in an all-round open state of rhizome. Rhizome (or tuber) means various branches and twigs intertwine and interweave with each other without any center, grades, criteria, and order. It becomes, reproduces and thrives on a level ground, and has no fixed roots, without beginning and ending. It extends randomly to all directions. This well-known ‘nomadic’ and ‘rhizome’ theory is a tough (and partly correct) criticism on the mode of describing time, history, and human spiritual image with ‘tree form’. It is evident that the theory has very high interpretative validity over cyber space and digital culture and arts in the internet era, because ‘rhizome’ embodies the infinite productivity of the desire machine for its principal characteristics like connectivity, heterogeneity, plurality, anti-signification fission, cartography, and appliqué.

但与德勒兹相交多年的巴迪欧，却从中看到了一个高度信赖自身“直觉”的贵族精英知识分子，一个“简装的柏拉图主义者”。巴迪欧的意思是，德勒兹的思想不断地冲破边界，不断地打破辖域的藩篱，看起来很多元、很民主、很革命，但这一切只是追求表面上的形式流变，去辖域化最终有一个本体上的参照系，即那个原生性的独一无二的存在。这样，德勒兹的存在物在生成过程之中经历的是一个双重过程，一方面，它不

断地去打破既有的形式上的边界，这是一种断裂和拆分，另一方面，存在物在指向本体上的存在时被综合起来。

However, Badiou, who has close personal relationship with Deleuze for years, sees Deleuze as a noble intellectual elite which trust totally their own 'intuition', and a 'simple-packaged Platonist'. What Badiou wants to say may be that, though Deleuze's thinking constantly breaks the boundaries and the fences of territory, and is seemingly pluralistic, democratic and revolutionary, yet all this is only a pursuit of superficial alteration of forms. Deterritorialization has ultimately ontological reference system---the unique protogenetic existence. So the becoming of Deleuze's existent undergoes a double process: on the one hand, it breaks continuously the existing formal boundaries, which is a kind of fracture and disjunction; on the other hand, all the existents are synthesized when referring to ontological existence.

德勒兹称这个过程为断裂性综合(systhèse disjonctive)，对此，巴迪欧的看法一语中的，“德勒兹在本体上坚持独一无二的存在，与他在形式和现象层面去号召打破那些固有的藩篱，去辖域化并没有什么矛盾.....因为只有打破那些藩篱和边界，做到去辖域化，才能真正地通向那个本体上的独一无二的存在。”<sup>12</sup>由而可知，对线性时间观的解构，如果仅导向平面上的多样性形式繁衍，并不会带来世界的实质性改变，反而会加固形而上学的根基并泛化其秩序。游牧者的结局也相当不妙，巴迪欧在《世界的逻辑》开篇就指出，他们将面临着一个新的尴尬，即“除了身体和语言之外，一无所有”。由此可见，“游牧”伦理与“介入”伦理虽然都具有行动性、生成性，但两者的区别绝不是姿态上的或路径、方法上的区别，而是忠实于真理还是屈服于实用主义之间的区别。

Deleuze names this process as systhèse disjonctive. Badiou has pertinent comments on this by saying that there is no contradiction between his insistence in unique existence and his call for breaking those existing confinements at the level of form and phenomenon or deterritorialization...because it is after the confinements and boundaries are broken and deterritorialization is achieved that the ontologically unique existence can be truly approached. Hence the deconstruct of the notion of linear time will not result in an essential change of the world but consolidate the foundation of metaphysics and popularize its order, if it only leads to reproducing multiple forms on a plane. In the meantime, the future of the nomads is not so optimistic, as is pointed out by Badiou at the beginning of *Logics of Worlds*, for they are facing a new embarrassment that is having nothing except body and language. From this we can see that, although both Nomadic ethics and Engagement ethics have the traits of action and generation, they differ not in attitude or in a methodological way, but in whether to be loyal to the truth or yielding to Pragmatism.

“介入”是一个重新为时间塑形的时刻。这一介入行动的“当下”性，对于文学艺术及其批评来讲，有着更为深刻的意义，因为文学艺术“叙事”的一大努力便在于，为时间寻找某种可经验的形式。文学艺术并不满足于在“过去——现在——将来”这样一个线性的、单向度的时间框架内来理解时间，也不会持久地迷恋于“去时间”、“去深度”的形式化平面延展，文学艺术本身要创造各种时间，并通过创造时间来创造生活这是一种更为积极的非德勒兹的、后海德格尔主义的时间意识，由于“当下”凸出了时间维度在聚合过程中所产生的偶性张力，必然会以改变空间形态的方式改变此在的生存论结构和语言方式，从而把孤独的、沉思的个体以及四处流荡的游牧者，投放到与他人相关的行动领域之中，——此在的“在世”变成了主体间交往性的“共同在世”，而不是无意识地相互缠绕。

Engagement is the moment where we re-configure time. For art and literature and their criticism, the 'present-ness' of engagement has far more profound significance. Because to find a form that can be experienced for time is one of the endeavors of literary and artistic narration. Literature and art are not content to understand time in this linear and one-Dimensional 'past-present-future' frame of time. Neither will it be obsessed with the formalistic planar extension of 'de-temporalization' and 'de-profundity'. It must create various kinds of time and thereby create new life. This non-Deleuzean, post-Heideggerian time consciousness is way more positive. 'The present' highlights the sporadic tension produced in the polymerization process of time dimension. This will inevitably change the existential structure and the language form of Dasein by way of transforming its spatial form and consequently put the lonely contemplative individual and wandering nomad into an action realm related to other people. 'In-the-world' of Dasein becomes a communicative 'in-the-world-together' between subjects rather than unconscious entanglement.

当代批评有必要充分地意识到这一切。事实上，互动的主体间性十分依赖作为媒介的语言，而历史和现实已经给我们准备了大量可供选择、挪用、改造和创发的语言，我们从来也不是“无话可说”。“语言既不是基础，也不是个客体；语言是媒介；语言是中介、中间，正是在它当中并且通过它，主体才为自己定位，世界才彰显自己。”<sup>13</sup> 语用学转向促成了主体哲学的决定性变革，正如哈贝马斯所认同的米德的看法，“个体化不是一个独立的行为主体.....的自我实现，而是一个以语言为中介的社会化过程和自觉的生活历史建构过程”<sup>14</sup>。当我们通过非客观化的方式在他人身上，尤其是在历史上可资学习、批判的先贤们的语言形体上再度认识自己时，一个“介入”行动必然携带着的主体为自己命名的时刻就来到了。

Contemporary criticism should be fully aware of this. Actually, interactive inter-subjectivity depends thoroughly on language as media, while history and reality have supplied to us voluminous languages to be chosen, appropriated, transformed and multiplied. So we never meet the trouble of 'having nothing to say'. Language is neither a foundation nor an object, but a medium and an in-between; it is only within it

and by it that subject locates itself, and the world reveals itself. The turn of pragmatics has promoted the decisive transformation of the philosophy of subject. Habermas cannot agree more with Mead by saying that, individualization is not the self-fulfillment of an autonomous agent but a process of socialization mediated by language and conscious construction of life history. When we recognize ourselves non-objectively on other people, especially on the language forms of our forerunners who are open to study and criticism, a moment for a subject to name itself comes. This moment is necessarily carried in an engaging action.

“介入”行动就是“以言行事”，就是通过“切入世界”来“诞生自我”，在公共领域中获得纯粹的“人类归属感”，并重新“为时间塑形”，——在此“当下”时刻，他人、时间、语言与自我被“介入”行动情境性地联结起来，生成了批评伦理主体特有的不可或缺的时间维面和他者维面，以及他与诸多不同声音的持续的对话关系。

在批评伦理的视野里，马拉美的“改变语言”和马克思的“改变世界”一点也不矛盾，两者完全可以变成一回事儿，它们本来也应该是一回事儿。

Engagement is an illocutionary act which aims to ‘create a new self’, to obtain a pure sense of belonging in the public sphere and to re-configuration time through ‘inserting into the world’---at this moment of the present, the other、time、language and self are interconnected by the situational action of engagement, hence the indispensable dimension of Time and Other in the critical subject of ethics is generated, together with the continuous interlocutory relationship between him and other voices. In the view of critical ethics, Stephane Mallarme’s ‘changing the language’ and Karl Marx’s ‘changing the world’ do not contradict, for they can mean the same thing. They should have been the same.

当下的介入是一个非常时刻，无论是庶民、底层、受压迫者，还是各种极权主义或霸权主义（政治的、资本的、意识形态的）对手，要获得自己的历史主体性，正需要这样的时刻，如果没有这一时刻的“解放”和“聚焦”，人们根本无法呈现出自己的或他人的焕然一新的面目。反之，如果人们无力承受当下、此刻那种具有爆炸力的甚至可能对“自我”构成毁灭性的挑战，那么，一切事情都不会发生，所有的可能——从真实的洞察力到参与性真理，从主体性匮乏的克服到道德政治的救赎——就会夭折在十分盲目的脆弱、怯懦和短视里。

Engagement at the present is an extraordinary moment which is necessary for both the plebs, people at the bottom of the society, and the suppressed and various rivals of totalitarianism and hegemony (be it political, capital, or ideological) to obtain their historical subjectivity. Without this emancipating and concentrating moment, people would not be able to present their own completely new countenance or that of others. Contrariwise, if people do not have the strength to confront the challenge of the

present, of this moment, the challenge which has the explosive power and is even destructive to 'the self', then nothing will happen. Every possibility—from real insightfulness to participatory truth, from the overcoming of subject deficiency to the salvation of moral politics—will die prematurely in blind susceptibility, cowardice and short-sightedness.

#### 注释:

- 1、参见茨维坦·托多罗夫：《象征理论》第六章，北京：商务印书馆，2010年版。
- 2、利维纳斯：《生存及生存者》，杭州：浙江人民出版社，1987年版，第101页。
- 3、哈贝马斯：《后形而上学思想》，南京：译林出版社，2001年版，第179页。
- 4、转引自阎嘉主编：《文学理论精粹读本》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2006年版，第336页。
- 5、马克斯·舍勒：《价值的颠覆》，北京：三联书店，1997年版，第20、149页。
- 6、斯拉沃热·齐泽克：《敏感的主体》，南京：江苏人民出版社，2006年版，第436-437页。
- 7、马克斯·舍勒：《价值的颠覆》，北京：三联书店，1997年版，第160页。
- 8、参见海德格尔：《存在与时间》第一篇第五章，第二篇第二章，北京：生活·读书·新知三联书店，1987年版。
- 9、Hannah Arendt: *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, Harcourt Brace, 1954, 第186页。
- 10、汉娜·阿伦特：《人的境况》，上海：上海人民出版社，2009年版，第139页。
- 11、参见德勒兹、加塔利：《千高原》导论部分相关内容，上海：上海书店出版社，2010年版。
- 12、均转引自蓝江：《德勒兹的本体论与永久轮回——浅析巴迪欧对德勒兹的批判》，载于《现代哲学》2011年第5期。
- 13、保罗·利科：《解释的冲突》，北京：商务印书馆，2008年版，第314-315页。
- 14、哈贝马斯：《后形而上学思想》，南京：译林出版社，2001年版，第173页。